STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and all co- defendants, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. A status conference was held on September 11, 2012. All parties were present.
2. By this stipulation, the parties move to continue the status conference until October 16, 2012 and to exclude time between September 11, 2012 and October 16, 2012 under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a. The government is attempting to produce discovery to the defense, and the defense is attempting to produce certain discovery to the government.
b. Counsel for defendants desire additional time to consult with their clients and conduct additional investigation, as well as to conduct negotiations with the government and prepare for a possible jury trial.
c. Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government joins in the request for the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of September 11, 2012 and October 16, 2012, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), (B)(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at the defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
DATED: October 1, 2012 /s/ Daniel S. McConkie DANIEL S. McCONKIE Assistant United States Attorney DATED: October 1, 2012 /s/ Ron Peters RON PETERS Counsel for Defendant FRANKIE THOMAS GOULDING Per email authorization DATED: October 1, 2012 /s/ Robert M. Holley ROBERT M. HOLLEY Counsel for Defendant LEO WILLIAM MATAAFA Per email authorization DATED: October 1, 2012 /s/ John R. Duree JOHN R. DUREE Counsel for Defendant JACLYN SUSAN MAJSTORIC Per email authorization