The opinion of the court was delivered by: Judge: Honorable Garland E. Burrell, Jr.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER Date: December 7, 2012 Time: 9:00 a.m.
The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Jill Thomas, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Ricardo Venegas, John R. Manning, Esq., and counsel for defendant Virgilio Pineda, David Fischer, Esq., hereby stipulate the following:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on October 19, 2012.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until December 7, 2012 and to exclude time between October 19, 2012 and December 7, 2012 under the Local CodeT-4 (to allow defense counsel time to prepare).
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request the Court find the following:
a. Counsel for the defendants need additional time to review the discovery, conduct investigation, and interview potential witnesses.
b. This court has approved funding for Dayle Carlson, sentencing expert. Mr. Carlson is reviewing the discovery; indictment; proposed plea agreement; meeting with counsel and Mr. Venegas to discuss potential mitigation issues. Counsel for Mr. Venegas will, additionally, be filing (via separate motion) a stipulation requesting USPO prepare a pre-plea PSR.
c. Counsel for Mr. Pineda was relatively recently appointed and needs additional time to review the discovery and conduct investigation.
d. Counsel for defendants believe the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
e. The Government does not object to the continuance. f. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
g. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) within which trial must commence, the time period of October 19, 2012 to December 7, 2012, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) ) and (B)(ii) and (iv), corresponding to Local Code T-4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
Dated: October 17, 2012 /s/ John R. Manning JOHN R. MANNING Attorney for Defendant Ricardon Venegas Dated: October 17, 2012 /s/ David Fischer DAVID FISCHER Attorney for Defendant Virgilio Pineda Dated: October 17, 2012 Benjamin B. Wagner United States ...