IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
October 22, 2012
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
EDWARD DANIEL HARSH II, DEFENDANT.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Morrison C. England, JR United States District Judge
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER United States Attorney TODD A. PICKLES Assistant United States Attorneys 501 I Street, Suite 10-100 Sacramento, CA 95814 Telephone: (916) 554-2700 Facsimile: (916) 554-2900 Attorneys for UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on October 18, 2012. 2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until November 16, 2012, at 1:00 p.m. and to exclude time between October 18, 2012 and November 16, 2012 under Local Code T4. The United States does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a. The United States has represented that the discovery associated with this case
includes investigative reports and related documents in electronic form amounting to approximately 268 pages of documents. All of this discovery has been produced directly to counsel for Mr. Harsh. b. After consultation, Mr. Harsh and counsel desire additional time to consult, to review discovery, and to discuss potential resolutions, including setting the matter for trial.
c. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. d. The United States does not object to the continuance. e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of October 18, 2012 to November 16, 2012, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
In accordance with the parties' stipulation, IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED . The status conference in this matter previously set for October 18, 2012 is continued to November 16, 2012 at 1:00 p.m. in Courtroom No. 7.
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