IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
October 22, 2012
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
LEONID YAKOVLEV, DEFENDANT.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on October 22, 2012, at 9:30 a.m.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until November 19, 2012 at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between October 22, 2012 and November 19, 2012, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government represents that the discovery associated with this case includes over 5,000 pages of documents and large spreadsheets detailing over 40,000 separate transactions, and thousands of fraud complaints to American Express. All of this discovery has been produced directly to counsel for the defense.
b. Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with his client, to review the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to discuss potential resolutions with his/her client, and to otherwise prepare for trial.
c. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence, noting that defense counsel's trial schedule in another case has been unexpectedly modified since the last continuance of this case, disrupting his ability to complete the tasks he wishes to perform.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of October 22, 2012, at 9:30 a.m. to November 19, 2012, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
DATED: October 18, 2012 /s/ Jean M. Hobler___________________ JEAN M. HOBLER Assistant United States Attorney DATED: October 18, 2012 /s/ Bruce Locke _____________ BRUCE LOCKE Counsel for Defendant
[as authorized on October 18, 2012]
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