IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
October 22, 2012
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
SVETLANA DUBINSKY, SERGE DOUBINSKI, ZINAYDA CHEKAYDA, DEFENDANTS,
CHRISTOPHER J. CANNON, State Bar No. 88034 Sugarman & Cannon 180 Montgomery Street Suite 2350 San Francisco, CA 94104 Telephone: 415-362-6252 Facsimile: 415-362-6431 Attorney for Defendant SERGE DOUBINSKI
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER
Defendants Serge Doubinski, Svetlana Dubinsky, and Zinayda Chekayda, by and through their counsel of record, and Plaintiff, by and through its counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on October 22, 2012.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until December 17, 2012 and to exclude time between October 22, 2012 and December17, 2012 under Local Code T4 and Local Code T2. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes approximately 1.6 gigabytes of investigative reports and related documents in PDF format totaling more than 15,000 pages. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b. By order of the Court, this case was related to three other cases: Cr. S-12-328, Cr. S- 12-329, and Cr. S-12-330. In total, the cases have nine defendants and concern allegations of mortgage fraud associated with at least nineteen properties. Given the amount of discovery, the number of defendants, and the nature of the charges, counsel for the defendants and the plaintiff believe this case is complex under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(ii) [Local Code T2] .
c. Counsel for defendants desire additional time to consult with their clients, to review the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to review and copy discovery for this matter, to discuss potential resolutions with their clients, and to prepare pretrial motions.
d. Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
e. The government does not object to the continuance.
f. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
g. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of October 22, 2012 to December 17, 2012, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
This time period is also deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(ii) [Local Code T2].
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
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