Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Official citation and/or docket number and footnotes (if any) for this case available with purchase.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

United States of America v. Moises Rodriguez.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA


October 25, 2012

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
PLAINTIFF,
v.
MOISES RODRIGUEZ. DEFENDANT,

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Sheila K. Oberto United States Magistrate Judge

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on October 29, 2012 at 1:30 p.m.

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to vacate the status conference and set the matter for change of plea on November 19, 2012 at 10:00 a.m. before United States District Judge Lawrence O'Neill and to exclude time between October 29, 2012 and, November 19, 2012 under 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv). Plaintiff does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. The government has represented that the discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.

b. A plea agreements has been prepared and provided to counsel that was represented by counsel for the defendant to be dispositive.

c. Counsel for defendant needs the additional time for completion of its investigation, preparation, and execution of the plea agreement. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation and resolution, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

d. The government does not object to the continuance.

e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of October 29, 2012 to November 19, 2012, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants interest in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

DATED: October 25, 2012 /s/ Laurel J. Montoya LAUREL J. MONTOYA Assistant United States Attorney DATED: October 25, 2012 /s/ Cary O. Lindstrom CARY O. LINDSTROM Attorney for Defendant

Attorney for Defendant Yao Ming Yu ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED.

20121025

© 1992-2012 VersusLaw Inc.



Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Official citation and/or docket number and footnotes (if any) for this case available with purchase.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.