IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
October 25, 2012
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
OMAR CESAR SOTELO, DEFENDANTS
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Sheila K. Oberto United States Magistrate Judge
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER United States Attorney LAUREL J. MONTOYA Assistant United States Attorneys 2500 Tulare Street, Suite 4401 Fresno, CA 93721 Telephone: (559) 497-4000 Facsimile: (559) 497-4099 Attorneys for Plaintiff
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his/her counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on October 29 17, 2012 at 1:00 p.m.
2. By this stipulation, the parties now move to continue the status conference until December 17, 2012 at 1:00 p.m. and to exclude time between October 29, 2012 and, December 17, 2012 under 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv).
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has provided all the discovery in this matter that is available to date or has made said discovery available to the defense for inspection.
b. Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with his client and the government as negotiations continue to be active and ongoing. Additional investigation is necessary and ongoing.
c. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation and resolution, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government stipulates to the need for the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of July 16, 2012 to August 27, 2012, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
The parties' request for a continuance of the status conference is DENIED. The parties are cautioned that a request for an extension of time must be supported by good cause and shall include a detailed explanation demonstrating due diligence, including a description of what actions have been undertaken to move the case forward.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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