The opinion of the court was delivered by: Morrison C. England, Jr. United States District Judge
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER THEREON
Date: December 6, 2012 Time: 9:00 a.m. Judge: Hon. Morrison C. England
IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED to between the United States of America through PAUL HEMESATH, Assistant U.S. Attorney, and defendant MIGUEL ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ by and through his counsel, BENJAMIN GALLOWAY, Assistant Federal Defender, that the status conference set for Thursday, October 25, 2012, be continued to Thursday, December 6, 2012 at 9:00 a.m.
The reason for this continuance is to allow defense counsel additional time to review discovery with the defendant, to examine possible defenses, and to continue investigating the facts of the case.
The parties stipulate that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
Speedy trial time is to be excluded from the date of this order through the date of the status conference set for December 6, 2012, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (h)(7)(B)(iv) [reasonable time to prepare], Local Code T4.
Dated: October 22, 2012 Respectfully submitted, DANIEL J. BRODERICK Federal Defender /s/ Benjamin Galloway BENJAMIN D. GALLOWAY Assistant Federal Defender Attorney for Defendant MIGUEL ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ Dated: October 22, 2012 BENJAMIN B. WAGNER United States Attorney /s/ Benjamin Galloway for PAUL HEMESATH Assistant U.S. Attorney Attorney for Plaintiff
Based on the stipulation of the parties and good cause appearing therefrom, the Court hereby adopts the stipulation of the parties in its entirety as its order. It is hereby ordered that the presently set October 25, 2012 status conference shall be continued to December 6, 2012 at 9:00 a.m.
It is further ordered that the time period from the date of the parties' stipulation, October 22, 2012, through and including the date of the new status conference, December 6, 2012, shall be excluded from computation of time within which the trial of this matter must be commenced under the Speedy Trial Act, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (h)(7)(B)(iv) and Local Code T4 [reasonable time for defense counsel to prepare].
The Court hereby finds that the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time for effective preparation taking into account the exercise of due diligence. The Court specifically finds that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
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