(Super. Ct. No. 10F06776)
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Blease , J.
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
Defendant George Samuel Bronk appeals from the sentence imposed following his plea of guilty to multiple counts of computer access fraud (Pen. Code, § 502, subd. (c)(1)),*fn1 false personation (§ 529) and one count of possession of child pornography (§ 311.11, subd. (a)). He contends the prospective application of section 4019, the conduct credit provisions of the Realignment Act, violates equal protection principles. Following the California Supreme Court's decision in People v. Lara (2012) 54 Cal.4th 896, 906, footnote 9 (Lara), we reject this claim.
RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY*fn2
Defendant pled guilty to three counts of computer access fraud, three counts of false personation, and one count of possession of child pornography. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of four years and eight months in state prison. Defendant was awarded 267 days of actual custody credits and 132 days of conduct credits under the version of section 4019 then in effect.
Defendant argues that the prospective application of section 4019, the conduct credit provisions of the Realignment Act, violates equal protection principles. This argument was rejected by the California Supreme Court in Lara, supra.
In Lara, the Supreme Court explained its rejection of the defendant's equal protection argument as follows: "As we there [People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 328-330 (Brown)] explained, '"[t]he obvious purpose"' of a law increasing conduct credits '"is to affect the behavior of inmates by providing them with incentives to engage in productive work and maintain good conduct while they are in prison." [Citation.] "[T]his incentive purpose has no meaning if an inmate is unaware of it. The very concept demands prospective application."' (Brown, at p. 329, quoting In re Strick (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 906, 913 [Citation.].) Accordingly, prisoners who serve their pretrial detention before such a law's effective date, and those who serve their detention thereafter, are not similarly situated with respect to the law's purpose. (Brown, at pp. 328-329.)" (Lara, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 906, fn. 9.)
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: RAYE , P. J. ...