The opinion of the court was delivered by: Charles F. Eick United States Magistrate Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF REMAND
Pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's and Defendant's motions for summary judgment are denied and this matter is remanded for further administrative action consistent with this Opinion.
Plaintiff filed a complaint on April 24, 2012, seeking review of the Commissioner's denial of benefits. The parties filed a consent to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge on May 22, 2012.
Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on October 4, 2012. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on October 25, 2012. The Court has taken both motions under submission without oral argument. See L.R. 7-15; "Order," filed April 25, 2012.
BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION
Plaintiff asserts disability based on a combination of alleged impairments (Administrative Record ("A.R.") 42-672). An Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") found that, despite severe impairments, Plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity to perform a restricted range of light work (A.R. 27-29). One of the restrictions on the work Plaintiff can perform is a restriction to no more than occasional reaching "at or above the shoulder level" (A.R. 29). A vocational expert testified that a person so restricted could perform significant numbers of cashier II, office helper, and charge account clerk jobs (A.R. 67-68). The ALJ did not ask the vocational expert whether the expert's testimony was consistent with the information contained in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT") (A.R. 68-69). According to the DOT, the jobs of cashier II, office helper and charge account clerk require reaching "frequently." See DOT §§ 205.367-014, 211.462-010, 239.567-010. The ALJ relied on the vocational expert's testimony in finding Plaintiff not disabled (A.R. 33-34). The Appeals Council denied review (A.R. 1-3). /// /// ///
Under 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), this Court reviews the Administration's decision to determine if: (1) the Administration's findings are supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the Administration used correct legal standards. See Carmickle v. Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation and quotations omitted); see Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006).
Social Security Ruling 00-4p*fn1 provides:
Occupational evidence provided by a [vocational expert] generally should be consistent with the occupational information supplied by the DOT. When there is an apparent unresolved conflict between [vocational expert] evidence and the DOT, the adjudicator must elicit a reasonable explanation for the conflict before relying on the [vocational expert] evidence to support a determination or decision about whether the claimant is disabled. At the hearings level, as part of the adjudicator's duty to fully develop the record, the adjudicator will inquire on the record, as to whether or not there is such consistency. . . . When a VE or VS provides evidence about the requirements of a job or occupation, the adjudicator has an affirmative responsibility to ask about any possible conflict between that VE or VS evidence and information provided in the DOT.
"The procedural requirements of SSR 00-4p ensure that the record is clear as to why an ALJ relied on a vocational expert's testimony, particularly in cases where the expert's testimony conflicts with the [DOT]." Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2007); see Light v. Social Security Administration, 119 F.3d 789, 794 (9th Cir. 1997) (error exists where "[n]either the ALJ nor the vocational expert explained the reason for departing from the DOT"); Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1435 (9th Cir. 1995) ("an ALJ may rely on expert testimony which contradicts the DOT, but only insofar as the record contains persuasive evidence to support the deviation").
In the present case, the ALJ erred by failing to "inquire, on the record, as to whether or not" the vocational expert's testimony was consistent with the information in the DOT. See SSR 00-4p. Whether this error was material depends on whether there existed "an apparent unresolved ...