ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND (Doc. 1) AMENDED COMPLAINT DUE WITHIN TWENTY ONE DAYS
John D. Francis ("Plaintiff") is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On April 17, 2012, Plaintiff filed his original complaint which is currently before the Court. Doc. 1.
II. Screening Requirement
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). "Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); see also Synagogue v. United States, 482 F.3d 1058, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007); NL Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). In determining whether to dismiss an action, the Court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, and construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421-22 (1969); Daniels-Hall v. National Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010).
III. Plaintiff's Complaint
Plaintiff is currently a state prisoner California State Prison, Corcoran in (CSPC) in Corcoran, California. The events central to Plaintiff's complaint occurred while he was incarcerated at CSPC. Doc. 1. In the complaint, Plaintiff names the following as a defendant in this action: 1) The Federal Receiver;*fn1 2) R. Gill (D.O.); 3) Warden of CSPC; 4) J. Yu (D.O.); 5) Eger Clark (M.D.); 6) C. McCabe (M.D.); 7) W. Ulit (M.D.); 8) B. Burr; 9) L. Karen (M.D.); 10) J. Ruff (Psychologist); 11) Jeffrey J. Wang (C.M.O.); 12) Teresa Macias (C.E.O); and 13) all the doctors on the Mars Committee in July 2010 and October 2011. Doc. 1 at 2. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief. Doc. 1 at 5.
Plaintiff states in his complaint that the warden of CSPC and the federal receiver are responsible for the medical treatment of prisoners under Plata and Armstrong and are violating the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the constitution in failing to carry out their duties. Doc. 1 at 5. According to Plaintiff, Defendants Gill, Yu, Clark, McCabe, Ulit, Burr, Karen, Ruff, Wang, and Macias failed in their duties to guarantee due process under the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Doc. 1 at 5. Plaintiff alleges that CSPC medical employees showed deliberate indifference by refusing to treat Plaintiff with proper pain medication. Doc. 1 at 3, 5.
Plaintiff alleges that there is a custom or policy of "not allowing patients to have class A narcotics" and disallowing "strong pain medications" to be dispensed. Doc. 1 at 3. According to Plaintiff, Defendants Gill, Yu, Clark, McCabe, Ulit, Burr, Karen, Ruff, Wang, Macias and all the doctors on both Mars committees all knew of Plaintiff's complaints of severe pain that went untreated but failed to do anything. Doc. 1 at 3. Plaintiff alleges that all the named defendants have created a conspiratorial custom and policy at CSPC to not medicate with "Class A narcotics" and other high pain medications. Doc. 1 at 3-4. According to Plaintiff, such a practice is not an accepted by the California Medical Association or by any other governmental authority. Doc. 1 at 4.
IV. Legal Standard and Analysis
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Facial plausibility demands more than the mere possibility that a defendant committed misconduct, Iqbal at 1950, and while factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not, id. at 1949.
Plaintiff's vague factual allegations and legal conclusions fail to comply with Rule 8(a). Plaintiff bears the burden of separately setting forth his legal claims and for each claim, briefly and clearly providing the facts supporting the claim so that the Court and Defendants are readily able to understand ...