The opinion of the court was delivered by: Sheila K. Oberto United States Magistrate Judge
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS THAT PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE (Docket No. 5)
OBJECTIONS DUE: 21 DAYS
On February 27, 2012, Plaintiff Ronald G. Pyle II ("Plaintiff") filed this action against Defendant First National Collection Bureau ("Defendant"). (Doc. 1.) On April 23, 2012, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint without prejudice and with 30 days leave to amend. Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint ("FAC") on May 17, 2012.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's FAC be DISMISSED with prejudice and without leave to amend.
Plaintiff brings the FAC pursuant to Title 15 Section 1681 for violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"). (Doc. 5.) Plaintiff alleges that in July 2011, he received his credit report from TransUnion, a major credit-reporting agency, and "discovered an entry by an entity that was unknown within the credit report." (Doc. 5, ¶ 9.) Upon examination, Plaintiff determined that Defendant "had obtained Plaintiff's private consumer credit report" in November 2009 "without [Plaintiff's] expressed consent or permissible purpose." (Doc. 5, ¶ 10 (emphasis omitted).)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant was "in violation of the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b[,] by obtaining Plaintiff's credit report without a permissible purpose from TransUnion, because at or about the time that Defendant obtained Plaintiff's credit report, none of the specific and strictly limited circumstances granting permissible purpose under section 1681b applied to Defendant." (Doc. 5, ¶ 12 (emphasis omitted).)
Plaintiff further alleges that "[t]he FCRA in 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(r)(4) defines what accounts have permissible purposes to obtain consumer reports." (Doc. 5, ¶ 13.) Plaintiff contends that the permissible accounts have "the same meaning as in section 1693a," which states that "the term 'account' means a demand deposit, savings deposit, or other asset account (other than an occasional or incidental credit balance in an open end credit plan as defined in section 1602(i)(1)." (Doc. 5,
¶ 13.) Plaintiff asserts "[t]herefore the open-ended credit plan with occasional or incidental balances, ie: credit cards[,] are clearly excluded from the permissible purposes." (Doc. 5, ¶ 14 (emphasis omitted).) Plaintiff alleges that "Defendant was heard to say, during Plaintiff's attempt to mitigate the dispute on 2-10-2012, that [Defendant] had a Providian credit card account in the Plaintiff's name, and the account was passed to another debt collector." (Doc. 5, ¶ 16.) As such, Plaintiff contends that he had no "contractual obligation or any expectation to pay the Defendant," and that Defendant had no "permissible purpose under the FCRA to obtain [Plainitff's] private credit files." (Doc. 5, ¶ 17.)
Plaintiff's FAC alleges one count for violation of the FCRA through "willful non-compliance" by Defendant, and seeks statutory damages in the amount of $1,000 and costs. (Doc.5, ¶¶ 18-25.)
In cases where the plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is required to screen each case and shall dismiss the case at any time if the Court determines that the allegation of poverty is untrue or the action or appeal is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). If the Court determines that the complaint fails to state a claim, leave to amend may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. Lopez
v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
B. Legal Standard for Screening
In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, the Court uses the same pleading standard used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Under Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). "[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). "[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). "[A] complaint [that] pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability . . . 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Further, although a court must accept as true all ...