IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
November 14, 2012
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF,
AHMED CHARTAEV KHADZHIMURAD BABATOV NICHOLAS VOTAW HAKOB SERGOYAN ANDREY KIM STANSLAV SARBER SERGEY SHCHIRSKY MAGOMED ABDUKHALIKOV ANTON TKACHEV
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Garland E. Burrell, Jr. Senior United States District Judge
DAVID D. FISCHER (SBN 224900) LAW OFFICES OF DAVID D. FISCHER, APC 1007 7th Street, Suite 100 Sacramento, CA. 95814 Tel. (916) 447-8600 Fax (916) 930-6482 E-Mail: firstname.lastname@example.org Attorney for Defendant NICHOLAS VOTAW
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and the defendants, by and through each counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on November 16, 2012.
2. By this stipulation, the defendants now move to continue the status conference until January 25, 2013, and to exclude time between November 16, 2012, and January 25, 2013, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes approximately 4,483 pages of investigative reports and related documents in electronic form. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b. Counsel for the defendants desires additional time to consult with their respective clients, to review the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to review and copy discovery for this matter, to discuss potential resolutions with their clients, to prepare pretrial motions, and to otherwise prepare for trial.
c. Counsel for the defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of November 16, 2012, to January 25, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
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