The opinion of the court was delivered by: Morrison C. England, Jr. United States District Judge
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through her counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. Defendant first appeared before Magistrate Judge Newman, a judicial officer in the court in which this charge is pending, on September 21, 2012. On that date, this matter was set for status on October 11, 2012 before Judge England. In addition, at the request of defendant, for the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period from September 21 through October 11, 2012, was deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and B (iv) [Local Code T4].
By previous stipulation, this Court continued the status conference until November 8, 2012 and excluded time between October 11, 2012 and November 8, 2012 under Local Code T4.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until December 13, 2012 and to exclude time between November 8, 2012 and December 13, 2012 under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the court find the following:
a. The government has represented that there is voluminous discovery associated with the case. To date, the government has produced approximately 1,262 pages of discovery. Moreover, hundreds of pages of materials obtained via grand jury subpoena have also been made available to the for inspection and copying by the defense. The government has just received additional tax return information which it also anticipates producing within the next week.
b. Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with his client, to review the current charges, to conduct investigation related to the charges, to review and potentially copy discovery for this matter, and to otherwise prepare for trial.
c. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Counsel for defendant has specifically discussed all of the contents of this stipulation with his client and represents that his client concurs with the contents of this stipulation.
f. Defendant Ryan Costo has specifically discussed all of the contents of this stipulation with his counsel and represents that he concurs with the contents of this stipulation.
g. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original dates prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
h. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of November 8, 2012 to December 13, 2012, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B (iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the judge at defendant's request on the basis of the judge's finding that the ends of ...