The opinion of the court was delivered by: Dean D. Pregerson United States District Judge
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND VACATING DEFENDANTS' EX PARTE APPLICATION [Dkt. Nos. 50, 57]
Presently before the court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Insufficient Service. After considering the parties' papers, the court DENIES the motion.
On March 26, 2012, Plaintiffs Law Offices of Amir Soleimanian and Amir Soleimanian, an individual, filed a Complaint against Defendants Kristina Wildeveld, Esq., an individual, and the Law Offices of Kristina Wildeveld, alleging infringement of Plaintiffs' registered trademark MR. TICKET, for legal services. Defendants filed no response to the Complaint, and Default was entered by clerk on June 1, 2012. A corrected default was entered by clerk on June 6, 2012. On October 9, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Permanent Injunction. On November 13, 2012, Defendants filed this Motion to Dismiss, alleging that they had not been served with the Complaint and summons.
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, service to an individual may be made by following state law for service or by complying with the procedures laid out in Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A corporation or other entity must be served either in compliance with state law or in compliance with Rule 4(h). If state law regarding service is followed, it may be the law of either the state where the district court is located or the state where service is made. Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 4(e)(1).
Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against two defendants: Kristina Wildeveld, an individual, and the Law Offices of Kristina Wildeveld, a Nevada law firm of unknown entity status. Compl. ¶¶ 3,4. For the court to have personal jurisdiction over both entities, service to each must be proper. See Jackson v. Hayakawa, 682 F.2d 1344, 1347 (9th Cir. 1982).
A. Service on Wildeveld as an Individual
Plaintiffs have provided a "Proof of Service by First Class Mail" stating that copies of the complaint, summons, and other documents were mailed to Kristina Wildeveld, Esq., (an individual) at 726 S. Casino Center Blvd., Ste 211, Las Vegas, NV, 89101 ("the Casino Center address") on March 29, 2012. (Dkt. No. 11.) In addition, Plaintiffs provided an Affidavit of Service by Joe Ricondo who stated that he served Kristina Wideveld, Esq., "by personally delivering and leaving a copy" at the Casino Center address with Maria Copodonna as "Secretary an agent lawfully designated by statute to accept service of process." (Id.)
Service is proper if it conforms to federal, California, or Nevada law. Under California law, "[i]n lieu of personal delivery . . . a summons may be served by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint during usual office hours in his or her office . . . with the person who is apparently in charge thereof, and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and complaint by first-class mail . . . to the person to be served at the place where a copy of the summons and complaint were left." Cal. Code Civ. P. § 415.20(a).
Here, the summons was left at the Casino Center address, where the Law Offices of Kristina Wildeveld ("the Wildeveld Law Offices") were located, and which therefore could be considered to be Ms. Wildeveld's office. According to Defendants, the Wildeveld Law Offices were in the process of moving from the Casino Center address to a different Las Vegas address in the final weeks of March 2012. Defendants state that "employees were present in both offices to facilitate this change and notices were posted in public view referencing this move. March 29, 2012 would have been among the final days that the office was open and although a single employee was present at the office on Casino Center Blvd., no documents, pleadings, or paperwork of any kind was ever served or left with the front desk receptionist." (Mot. at 6.) That single employee, Mara Copodonna, affirms that during the last week of March she was "alone in [the office at the Casino Center address] with a partial desk and a phone, as all items had been removed to the new office." (Copodonna Decl. ¶ 4.)
Because she was sitting at a desk in Ms. Wildeveld's office, apparently acting as the receptionist, Ms. Capodonna could have reasonably been considered to be the person in charge of the office. Defendants have not made any arguments to the contrary; they have pointed out only that the Offices were in the process of being moved. However, this fact on its own does not suggest that it was improper to effect service to the person apparently in charge of the office, which was still staffed by employees of Ms. ...