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Fernando Medina-Herrera v. Michael J. Astrue

December 6, 2012

FERNANDO MEDINA-HERRERA, PLAINTIFF,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, DEFENDANT.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Dennis L. Beck United States Magistrate Judge

ORDER REGARDING MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES (Document 25)

Petitioner Sengthiene Bosavanh ("Counsel"), attorney for Plaintiff Fernando MedinaHerrera, filed the instant Motion for Fees on October 4, 2012. Counsel requests fees in the amount of $11,629.00 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1).

Defendant did not file an opposition.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this action on October 6, 2009. On September 30, 2010, the Court granted the parties' stipulation and remanded the action for payment of benefits.

On December 23, 2010, the Court granted the parties' stipulation for attorney's fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA") in the amount of $4,650.00.

On August 5, 2012, the Commissioner issued a notice indicating that Plaintiff's retroactive benefits totaled $46,516.00. Exhibit 3, attached to Motion.

By this motion, Counsel seeks an award of $11,629.00 for 30.8 hours of attorney time.*fn1

This amount is equal to 25 percent of the past-due benefit award. After crediting $4,650.00 received previously pursuant to the EAJA, Counsel requests a net fee of $6,979.00 from the past-due award.

DISCUSSION

42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A) provides in relevant part:

Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment . . .

In Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002), the Supreme Court explained that a district court reviews a petition for section 406(b) fees "as an independent check" to assure that contingency fee agreements between claimants and their attorneys will "yield reasonable results in particular cases." The Court must respect "the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee agreements," id. at 793, "looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, then testing it for reasonableness." Id. at 808; see also Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2009). Agreements are not enforceable to the extent that they provide for fees exceeding 25 percent of the past-due benefits. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. "Within the 25 percent boundary. . . the attorney for the successful claimant must show that the fee sought is reasonable for the services rendered." Id.

In determining the reasonableness of an award, the district court should consider the character of the representation and the results achieved. Id. at 808. Ultimately, an award of section 406(b) fees is offset by an award of attorney's fees granted ...


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