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Joseluis Alcantar v. Hobart Service

December 13, 2012


The opinion of the court was delivered by: The Honorable Philip S. Gutierrez, United States District Judge


Present: The Honorable Philip S. Gutierrez, United States District Judge

Wendy K. Hernandez Not Present n/a Deputy Clerk Court Reporter Tape No. Attorneys Present for Plaintiff(s): Attorneys Present for Defendant(s): Not Present Not Present

Proceedings: (In Chambers) Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

Pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. # 41. The Court finds the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b);

L.R. 7-15. After considering the moving and opposing papers, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the motion.


Defendant Hobart Service ("Hobart") is a division of ITW Food Equipment Group, LLC ("ITW", together with Hobart, "Defendants"), a company that manufactures industrial equipment used for commercial food preparation, storage, production, and clean-up. See Mot. 3:2-3. Plaintiff Joseluis Alcantar ("Alcantar" or "Plaintiff") is currently employed by Hobart as a service technician, and has been employed since 1994. Id. 3:7-8; COE, Ex. 1 (Alcantar Dep. 9:18-23; 10:16-25; 11:1-12; 13:3-6). Plaintiff's primary responsibility is to repair and maintain industrial foodservice equipment on the premises of Hobart's customers. Mot. 3:9-11; COE, Ex. Alcantar Dep. 43:16-25; 44:1-13, 16-22); COE, Ex. 4 (Barhorst Decl. ¶ 3).

Defendants provide Plaintiff with a service van equipped with tools, parts, and other items necessary for Plaintiff to repair and maintain the equipment. SUF 9; COE, Ex. 1 (Alcantar Dep. 13:24-25; 14:1-10; 14:18-24; 16:3-6; 18:15-23); COE, Ex. 2; COE, Ex. 4 (Barhorst Decl. ¶ 6). Plaintiff uses his van to travel to each service assignment. SUF 9. Plaintiff has the option to leave his service van at his branch office at the end of the day or to drive his service van home.

, Ex. 2, ¶ 8; COE, Ex. 1 (Alcantar Dep. 64:24-65:1; 65:5-6), Workman Decl., Exs. R-X Brandon Decl. ¶8, 3:7-9; Coleman Decl. ¶9, 3:19-21; Evans-Hanna Decl. ¶9, 3:14-16; Hanna

. ¶9, 3:13-15; San Jose Decl. ¶9, 3:18-20; Miller Decl. ¶8, 3:9-11; Nemec Decl. ¶8, 3:17-19). Aside from driving the service van to and from his home, Plaintiff is not permitted to use the service van for any personal use. COE, Ex. 2, ¶ 5.

Plaintiff has been compensated on an hourly basis for the duration of his employment. 23; COE, Ex. 1 (Alcantar Dep. 23:15-21). The only form of compensation Plaintiff has received beyond his hourly wages consists of Special Incentive for Fine Performance ("SPIFF") payments, which are additional incentive payments employees can earn. SUF 24; COE, Ex. 1 Alcantar Dep. 24:5-14).

On October 5, 2011, Plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit against Defendants based on allegations that (1) Plaintiff was and is not compensated for his "normal commute" travel time; (2) Plaintiff's overtime pay has been incorrectly calculated due to Defendants' alleged failure to include SPIFF payments in the regular rate used to compute overtime pay; and (3) Defendants have failed to provide Plaintiff off-duty meal periods, or pay in lieu thereof, as required by California law. See SAC ¶¶ 21, 25, 30. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint asserts causes of action for violations of California Labor Code § 1194 (overtime wages); California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq. ("UCL"); and California Labor Code § 2699 ("Private Attorney General Act" or "PAGA").

Plaintiff filed a motion for class certification, which the Court denied. See Dkt. # 63. On October 29, 2012, Defendants filed this motion, seeking summary judgment as to all claims.

2:6-27; Dkt. # 44.

Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) establishes that a "court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party may move for summary judgment not only as to an entire case, but also as to a claim, defense, or part of a claim or defense. Id. The movant bears the initial burden to demonstrate the lack of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the movant satisfies the burden, the non-movant must set forth specific evidence showing that there remains a genuine issue for trial, and "may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading." See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986).

An issue of fact is a genuine and material issue if it cannot be reasonably resolved in favor of either party and may affect the outcome of the suit. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50. A party asserting that a fact cannot be genuinely disputed must support that assertion by citing to "materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). A party may object that material cited would not be admissible in evidence. See id. 56(c)(2). Admissible declarations or affidavits must be based on ...

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