IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
December 13, 2012
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF,
RICARDO ESCAMILLA, DEFENDANT,
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Lawrence J. O'Neill United States District Judge
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER United States Attorney LAUREL J. MONTOYA Assistant United States Attorneys 2500 Tulare Street, Suite 4401 Fresno, CA 93721 Telephone: (559) 497-4000 Facsimile: (559) 497-4099 Attorneys for Plaintiff
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for change of plea hearing on December 17, 2012 at 8:30 a.m.
2. By this stipulation, parties now move to continue the change of plea hearing until December 20, 2012 at 9:00 a.m. and to exclude time between December 17, 2012 and, December 20, 2012 under 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv).
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. An offer has been conveyed, a counteroffer has been made, approvals obtained, and the plea agreement is in the process of being prepared.
Escamilla Stipulation and Proposed Order
b. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation and resolution, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
c. The government does not object to, and agrees with the requested continuance.
d. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of December 17, 2012 to December 20, 2012, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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