STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. A status conference is scheduled for January 23, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, the parties move to continue the status conference until March 19, 2013 and to exclude time between January 23, 2013 and March 19, 2013 under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes voluminous investigative reports and related documents, dozens of discs, and tens of thousands of emails.
b. Counsel for defendant is new on the case and desires additional time to consult with his client and conduct additional investigation, as well as to conduct negotiations with the government and prepare for a possible jury trial.
c. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government joins in the request for the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of January 23, 2013 and March 19, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), (B)(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at the defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
DATED: January 7, 2013 /s/ Daniel S. McConkie DANIEL S. McCONKIE Assistant United States Attorney DATED: January 7, 2013 /s/ Alan Roy Baum ALAN ROY ...