IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
January 10, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Lawrence J. O'Neill United States District Judge
STIPULATION REGARDING CONTINUANCE AND EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
ANGEL RENE PIEDRA-VASQUES,
CASE NO. 1:12CR0258 LJO-SKO
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, the above-captioned related matters were set for a suppression hearing on Monday, February 4, 2013, at 10:15 a.m. It should be noted that Barbara O'Neill, counsel for Defendant Piedra-Vasques, has represented to the U.S. Magistrate Court that she intends to file a motion to join Defendant Becerra's suppression motion.
2. By this stipulation, the parties now move to continue the hearing date until February 11, 2013, at 11:00 a.m. and to exclude time between February 4 and February 11, 2013.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. Mr. Quinlan, counsel for Defendant Becerra, is currently in trial before Senior District Judge Anthony W. Ishii. The trial is expected to last another month.
b. Counsel for the government is scheduled to travel on Monday, February 4, to provide training to law enforcement agents on February 5 and February 6.
c. The parties believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them continuity of counsel and the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation and representation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The parties do not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of February 4, 2013, to February 11, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at the parties' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
DATED: January 10, 2013. Respectfully submitted, BENJAMIN B. WAGNER United States Attorney /s/ Karen A. Escobar___________________ KAREN A. ESCOBAR Assistant United States Attorney DATED: January 10, 2013. /s/ W. Scott Quinlan _____________ W. SCOTT QUINLAN Counsel for Defendant ANTONIO BECERRA-SANCHEZ DATED: January 10, 2013. /s/ Barbara O'Neill _____________ BARBARA O'NEILL Counsel for Defendant ANGEL RENE PIEDRA-VASQUES
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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