IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
January 12, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
ANDRANIK MARTIROSYAN, DEFENDANT.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Judge: Honorable William B. Shubb
STIPULATION REGARDING ) EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ) [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER Date: March 4, 2013 ) Time: 9:30 a.m.
The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Steven Lapham, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Andranik Martirosyan, John R. Manning, Esq., hereby stipulate the following:
1. This matter is set for status conference on January, 14, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, Mr. Martirosyan now moves to continue the status conference until March 3, 2013.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request the Court find the following:
a. Mr. Martisosyan was originally scheduled to be arraigned on July 10, 2012. Due to series health issues, Mr. Martirosyan was not arraigned until November 28, 2012. Mr. Martirosyan remains in very fragile health.
b. The Government has provided defense Counsel with over 700 pages of discovery.
c. The Defense is seeking a continuance in order to review the material provided by the Government and conduct, as necessary, investigation. (It should be noted, Mr. Martirosyan speaks very limited English and the services of an Armenian language interpreter is necessary to effectively communicate with the defendant.)
d. Counsel for Mr. Martirosyan believes a continuance in this case is necessary to allow counsel reasonable time to review the discovery, conduct investigation; meet with the defendant; and, afford the defense time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
e. The Government does not object to the continuance. f. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
g. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) within which trial must commence, the time period of January 14, 2013 to March 4, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) ) and (B)(ii) and (iv), corresponding to Local Code T-4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
Dated: January 10, 2013 /s/ John R. Manning JOHN R. MANNING Attorney for Defendant Andranik Martirosyan Dated: January 10, 2013 Benjamin B. Wagner United States Attorney by: /s/ Steven Lapham STEVEN LAPHAM Assistant U.S. Attorney
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
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