(Super. Ct. No. 11F00068)
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Murray , J.
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
In September 2011, defendant Michelle Sophia Walker pled no contest to two counts of first degree burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (a))*fn1 and admitted that she knew each victim was age 65 years or older (§ 667.9, subd. (a)). In exchange, 19 related counts were dismissed with a Harvey waiver.*fn2 Defendant was sentenced to prison for four years eight months and was awarded 361 days' custody credit and 180 days' conduct credit.
On appeal, defendant contends principles of equal protection entitle her to additional presentence conduct credit. Specifically, she claims the October 2011 amendment to section 4019 must be applied retroactively so that her 361 days' custody credit entitle her to 361 days' conduct credit. We affirm.
Defendant contends prospective application of section 4019, the conduct credit provision of the Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011 (Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 482), violates equal protection principles. After defendant filed her opening brief, our Supreme Court decided People v. Lara (2012) 54 Cal.4th 896 (Lara), which rejected defendant's contention. (Lara, supra, at p. 906, fn. 9.)
In Lara, our Supreme Court explained its rejection of the defendant's equal protection argument as follows: "As we . . . explained [in People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 328-330], ' "[t]he obvious purpose " ' of a law increasing conduct credits ' "is to affect the behavior of inmates by providing them with incentives to engage in productive work and maintain good conduct while they are in prison." [Citation.] "[T]his incentive purpose has no meaning if an inmate is unaware of it. The very concept demands prospective application." ' (Brown, at p. 329, quoting In re Strick (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 906, 913.) Accordingly, prisoners who serve their pretrial detention before such a law's effective date, and those who serve their detention thereafter, are not similarly situated with respect to the law's purpose. (Brown, at pp. 328-329.)" (Lara, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 906, fn. 9.)
Under the equal protection analysis of Lara, defendant is not entitled to additional presentence conduct credit.
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: RAYE , P. J. ...