Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Official citation and/or docket number and footnotes (if any) for this case available with purchase.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

United States of America v. Nicholas Votaw

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA


January 18, 2013

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF,
v.
NICHOLAS VOTAW DEFENDANT.

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hon. John A. Mendez United States District Judge

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and the defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on January 22, 2013.

2. By this stipulation, the defendant now moves to continue the status conference until March 12, 2013, and to exclude time between January 22, 2013 and March 12, 2013 at 9:45 a.m., under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes approximately 2,416 pages of investigative reports and related documents in electronic form. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying. b. Counsel for the defendant desires additional time to consult with his client, to review the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to review and copy discovery for this matter, to discuss potential resolutions with his client, to prepare pretrial motions, and to otherwise prepare for trial. c. Counsel for the defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. d. The government does not object to the continuance. e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of January 22, 2013, to March 12, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: January 17, 2013 BENJAMIN WAGNER U.S. ATTORNEY by: /s/ David D. Fischer for LEE BICKLEY Assistant U.S. Attorney Attorney for Plaintiff Dated: January 17, 2013 /s/ David D. Fischer DAVID D. FISCHER Attorney for Defendant NICHOLAS VOTAW

ORDER

John A. Mendez

20130118

© 1992-2013 VersusLaw Inc.



Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Official citation and/or docket number and footnotes (if any) for this case available with purchase.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.