STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on January 22, 2013 at 1:30 p.m.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until April
22, 2013 at 1:30 p.m. and to exclude time between January 22, 2012 and, April 22, 2013 under 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv). Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes approximately 508 pages of investigative reports and related documents in electronic form as well as approximately 25 CDs of interviews, photographs and video recordings. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
Chan, et al. Stipulation and Proposed Order
b. Offers have been conveyed, counteroffers have been made, and plea agreements have been prepared as to several of the defendants that the parties felt were reasonably likely to result in the resolution. However, within the last week the government was provided information that potentially affects the offers that are currently outstanding and the status of the negotiations. Counsel for defendants and the government desire additional time to evaluate this information and reevaluate the offers that are outstanding.
c. Counsel for defendants need additional time for investigation and preparation. Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation and resolution, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. The parties are working toward either resolving the matter or set a trial date at the next status conference.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of January 22, 2013 to April 22, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants interest in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
DATED: January 17, 2013 /s/ Laurel J. Montoya LAUREL J. MONTOYA Assistant United States Attorney Chan, et al. DATED: January 17, 2013 /s/ Alonzo J. Gradford ALONZO J. GRADFORD Attorney for Defendant Andy Yung Kwong Chan DATED: January 17, 2013 /s/ Seth P. Chazin SETH P. CHAZIN Attorney for Defendant John Zhong Xian Huang DATED: January 17, 2013 /s/ George Siddell GEORGE SIDDELL Attorney for Defendant Chiu Chuen Lau DATED: January 17, 2013 /s/ Doron Weinberg DORON WEINBERG Attorney for Defendant Tony Chao Fan Luo DATED: January 17, 2013 /s/ Kirk McAllister KIRK ...