The opinion of the court was delivered by: Barbara A. McAuliffe United States Magistrate Judge
STIPULATION TO CONTINUE STATUS CONFERENCE; FINDINGS AND ORDER DATE: March 25, 2013 TIME: 1:00 P.M. JUDGE: Hon. Barbara A. McAuliffe
The United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on January 28, 2013 at 1:00 p.m.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until March 25, 2013 at 1:00 p.m. before Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe, and to exclude time between the date of this stipulation and through and including March 25, 2013 under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) and (iv). The government does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. This continuance is at the request of defense counsel as defense needs additional time in preparation of this case. Government counsel was in trial earlier this month and intends to provide defense a plea offer by tomorrow. Additional supplemental discovery will also be provided to the defense on the date of this stipulation. Defense will need additional time to review this supplemental discovery as well as the government's offer with his client.
b. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
c. The government does not object to the continuance.
d. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of January 23, 2013 to March 25, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) and (iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
DATED: January 23, 2013 /s/ Henry Z. Carbajal III HENRY Z. CARBAJAL III Assistant United States Attorney DATED: January 23, 2013 /s/Charles J. Lee CHARLES J. LEE ...