The opinion of the court was delivered by: Lawrence J. O'Neill United States District Judge
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for a status conference on Monday, February 4, 2013, at 8:30 a.m.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the hearing date to February 25, 2013, at 8:30 a.m. and to exclude time between February 4 and February 25, 2013 for further plea negotiations and due to the unavailability of counsel for the government.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. Counsel for defendant desires additional time to discuss and effectuate the most favorable resolution possible and counsel for the government is unavailable on February 4 due to out of town training.
b. Counsel for the parties believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny the defendant the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence, and would deny "the Government continuity of counsel."
c. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of October 1, 2012, to February 4, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at the parties' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
DATED: January 30, 2013. Respectfully submitted, BENJAMIN B. WAGNER United States Attorney /s/ Karen A. Escobar___________________ KAREN A. ESCOBAR Assistant United States Attorney DATED: January 30, 2013. /s/ Gary Huss_____________ GARY HUSS Counsel for Defendant