The opinion of the court was delivered by: John A. Mendez United States District Court Judge
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. On January 30, 2013, this matter was reassigned to United States District Judge John A. Mendez after the government filed a notice of related cases. United States v. Balero, Case No. 2:99-cr-00401-02 JAM is related to the above captioned case (United States v. Balero, Case No. 2:12-cr-0369 WBS). Pursuant to the January 30, 2013, order, all further proceedings for both matters will be held in front of Judge Mendez.
2. By previous order, and prior to the reassignment of this matter to Judge Mendez, this matter was set for a further status conference in front of Judge William B. Shubb on February 4, 2013.
3. By this stipulation, the parties move to continue the status conference until March 5, 2013 at 9:45 a.m., and to exclude time between February 4, 2013, and March 5, 2013, under Local Code T4.
4. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. Although the initial discovery provided to the defense by the government included a preliminary lab report, further lab analysis was requested on certain items of evidence related to this case. This additional lab analysis, which is being conducted by the DEA Western Regional Laboratory, is scheduled to be completed on or before February 4, 2013. At that time, a supplemental report will be generated and provided to both the government and defense. Once counsel for defendant receives this additional lab report, he will need time to review it, engage in additional research and investigation, discuss potential resolutions with his client, prepare pretrial motions, and/or otherwise prepare for trial.
b. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
c. The government joins in the request for the continuance.
d. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of February 4, 2013, to March 5, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), (B)(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at the defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. 4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
DATED: February 1, 2013 /s/ Michael D. McCoy MICHAEL D. McCOY Assistant United States Attorney DATED: February 1, 2013 /s/ Danny D. Brace, Jr. DANNY D. BRACE, JR. Counsel for Defendant ...