The opinion of the court was delivered by: Garland E. Burrell, Jr. Senior United States District Judge
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER Date: March 15, 2013 Time: 9:00 a.m. Judge: Honorable Garland E. Burrell, Jr.
The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Jill Thomas, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Ricardo Venegas, John R. Manning, Esq., hereby stipulate the following:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on February 8, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until March 15, 2013 and to exclude time between February 8, 2013 and March 15, 2013 under the Local CodeT-4 (to allow defense counsel time to prepare).
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request the Court find the following:
a. Counsel for the defendant needs additional time to review the discovery, conduct investigation, and interview potential witnesses.
b. This court has approved funding for Dayle Carlson, sentencing expert. Mr. Carlson is reviewing the discovery; indictment; proposed plea agreement; meeting with counsel and Mr. Venegas to discuss potential mitigation issues. Counsel for Mr. Venegas has, additionally, filed (via separate motion) a stipulation requesting USPO prepare a full pre-plea PSR. USPO recently produced the full pre-plea PSR and the Parties need time to review the information and recommendations contained therein.
c. Counsel for the defendant believes the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The Government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) within which trial must commence, the time period of February 8, 2013 to March 15, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) ) and (B)(ii) and (iv), corresponding to Local Code T-4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
Dated: February 5, 2013 /s/ John R. Manning JOHN R. MANNING Attorney for Defendant Ricardon Venegas Dated: February 5, 2013 Benjamin B. Wagner United States Attorney by: /s/ ...