IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento)
February 7, 2013
THE PEOPLE, PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT,
STEVEN QUINN, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
(Super. Ct. No. 11F01000)
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hoch , J.
P. v. Quinn
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
On appeal, defendant Steven Quinn contends the trial court's failure to award additional conduct credits pursuant to the Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011 (Realignment Act) (Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 482) constitutes a violation of equal protection. Following the California Supreme Court's decision in People v. Lara (2012) 54 Cal.4th 896 at page 906, footnote 9 (Lara), we reject defendant's contention. We affirm the judgment.
Defendant committed his offenses on January 24, 2011. He pled no contest to first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459, subd. (a)).*fn2 His conviction for first degree burglary is a serious felony. (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(18).) The trial court sentenced defendant to a stipulated term of two years in state prison and awarded 284 days of presentence credit (190 actual and 94 conduct).
The trial court sentenced defendant under the September 28, 2010, revision of the presentence credit law. Under that version, a defendant with a current or prior serious or violent felony conviction was entitled to two days of conduct credit for every four days of presentence custody. (Former §§ 2933, 4019.)
Prospective Application of Section 4019
The Realignment Act amended section 4019, entitling defendants to two days of conduct credits for every two days of presentence custody. (§ 4019, subds. (b), (c), (f).) The award of credits is not reduced by a defendant's current or prior conviction for a serious felony. This provision applies prospectively to defendants serving presentence incarceration for crimes committed on or after October 1, 2011. (§ 4019, subd. (h).)
Defendant argues that the prospective application of section 4019 violates the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions. This argument was rejected by the California Supreme Court in Lara. (Lara, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 906, fn. 9.)
In Lara, the Supreme Court explained its rejection of defendant's equal protection argument as follows: "As we there [People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 328-330] explained, '"[t]he obvious purpose"' of a law increasing credits '"is to affect the behavior of inmates by providing them with incentives to engage in productive work and maintain good conduct while they are in prison." [Citation.] "[T]his incentive purpose has no meaning if an inmate is unaware of it. The very concept demands prospective application."' (Brown, at p. 329, quoting In re Strick (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 906, 913.) Accordingly, prisoners who serve their pretrial detention before such a law's effective date, and those who serve their detention thereafter, are not similarly situated with respect to the law's purpose. (Brown, at pp. 328-329.)" (Lara, supra, at p. 906, fn. 9.)
Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to the additional accrual of conduct credits under the October 1, 2011, amendment to section 4019.
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: RAYE , P. J. MURRAY , J.