IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
February 8, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
ARTURO GONZALEZ-MORAN, AKA ISABEL GALLARDO, AND GILBERTO LORENZO-LUVIO, DEFENDANT,
The opinion of the court was delivered by: John A. Mendez United States District Court Judge
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
It is hereby stipulated between the parties, Michael D. McCoy, Assistant United States Attorney, Benjamin D, Galloway, Assistant Federal Defender, attorney for defendant Arturo Gonzalez-Moran, and Patrick K.M. McCarthy, attorney for defendant Gilberto Lorenzo-Luvio, as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for a status conference on February 12, 2013. 2. By this stipulation, the parties move to continue the status conference until March 19, 2013 at 9:45 a.m., and to exclude time between February 12, 2013, and March 19, 2013, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. Initial discovery was provided to the defense at the time of the defendants' arraignment. Recently, the government provided additional discovery to the defense in response to a supplemental discovery request. Moreover, the government anticipates providing additional discovery to the defense within the next week.
b. The defense will need time to review this discovery, engage in additional research and investigation, discuss potential resolutions with their clients, prepare pretrial motions, and/or otherwise prepare for trial.
c. Counsel for both defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government joins in the request for the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of February 12, 2013, to March 19, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), (B)(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at the defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
DATED: February 8, 2013 /s/ Michael D. McCoy MICHAEL D. McCOY Assistant United States Attorney DATED: February 8, 2013 /s/ Benjamin D. Galloway BENJAMIN D. GALLOWAY Assistant Federal Defender Counsel for Defendant ARTURO GONZALEZ-MORAN Per e-mail authorization /s/ Patrick K.M. McCarthy PATRICK K. M. McCARTHY Assistant Federal Defender Counsel for Defendant GILBERTO LORENZO-LUVIO Per e-mail authorization
John A. Mendez
© 1992-2013 VersusLaw Inc.