The opinion of the court was delivered by: John E. Mcdermott United States Magistrate Judge
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DISMISSING SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
On June 14, 2012, Roy Bridgeforth ("Plaintiff"), a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Complaint") in the Northern District of California. On June 19, 2012, the case was transferred, and the Complaint was filed in this Court on June 29, 2012.
On September 27, 2012, the Court issued a Memorandum and Order Dismissing Complaint With Leave to Amend. On October 12, 2012, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint.
On October 17, 2012, the Court issued a Memorandum and Order Dismissing First Amended Complaint With Leave to Amend. On November 19, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint ("SAC").
In accordance with the provisions governing in forma pauperis proceedings, the Court must screen the SAC before ordering service to determine whether the action: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). This screening is governed by the following standards:
A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for failure to state a claim for two reasons: (1) the plaintiff fails to state a cognizable legal theory; or (2) the plaintiff has alleged insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In determining whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1988). However, "the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). "'[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.'" Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).
Although a complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations" to survive dismissal, a plaintiff must provide "more than mere labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (rejecting the traditional "no set of facts" standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). The complaint must contain factual allegations sufficient to rise above the "speculative level" (Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), or the merely possible or conceivable. Id. at 557, 570.
Simply put, the complaint must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when the complaint presents enough facts "to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This standard is not a probability requirement, but "it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. A complaint that pleads facts that are merely consistent with liability stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility. Id.
In a pro se civil rights case, the complaint must be construed liberally to afford plaintiff the benefit of any doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). Before dismissing a pro se civil rights complaint for failure to state a claim, the plaintiff should be given a statement of the complaint's deficiencies and an opportunity to cure. Id. Only if it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment should the complaint be dismissed without leave to amend. Id. at 623; see also Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995).
After careful review and consideration of the SAC under the relevant standards and for the reasons discussed below, the Court finds theSAC must be DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.
Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the California Rehabilitation Center in Norco, California ("CRC-Norco"), which is within this judicial district. Plaintiff names in the caption "California Rehabilitation & Medical Doctors" as the defendants. However, in the body of the SAC, Plaintiff names as the sole defendant Dr. M. Levin, a staff physician at Centinela State Prison ("Centinela"). (SAC at 3.)
Plaintiff alleges that prison doctors have been deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs because they have refused to have Plaintiff undergo surgery for a hernia and cataracts. (See SAC at 5.) Plaintiff seeks an order requiring prison officials to provide him with such treatment. Plaintiff also seeks compensatory and punitive damages. (SAC at 5-6.) Documents attached to the SAC refer to medical treatment Plaintiff received while he was housed at several different institutions, including: Correctional Training Facility -Soledad ("CTF-Soledad"), ...