IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
February 14, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
PHILLIP JACOB SHINEN, DEFENDANT,
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Barbara A. McAuliffe United States Magistrate Judge
STIPULATION TO CONTINUE STATUS CONFERENCE; FINDINGS AND ORDER DATE: March 11, 2013 TIME: 1:00 P.M. JUDGE: Hon. Barbara A. McAuliffe
The United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on March 11, 2013 at 1:00 p.m.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until April 8, 2013 at 1:00 p.m. before Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe, and to exclude time between the date of this stipulation and April 8, 2013 under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) and (iv). The government does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes over 4,000 pages of discovery, including investigative reports, bank records and related documents.
All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b. Counsel for defendant desires additional time in preparation of this case. The parties have previously held settlement negotiations. The government intends to reduce the parties' negotiations to a written plea offer shortly. Counsel for the defendant desires additional time to review the plea offer and advise his client. Moreover, counsel for the defendant has a family trip to the East Coast planned the week of March 11, 2013. The parties anticipate that they will reach a resolution of the case by April 8, 2013, the date of the proposed status conference and request the additional time to do so.
c. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of the date of this stipulation to April 8, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) and (iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
DATED: February 14, 2013 /s/ Henry Z. Carbajal III HENRY Z. CARBAJAL III Assistant United States Attorney DATED: February 14, 2013 /s/Victor Sherman VICTOR SHERMAN Counsel for Defendant PHILLIP JACOB SHINEN
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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