STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and through their respective counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on February 25, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until May 6, 2013 at 9:30 a.m. and to exclude time between February 25, 2013 and May 6, 2013 under Local Code T4 . Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has produced approximately 40,000 pages of discovery associated with this case.
b. Counsel for defendants request additional time to review discovery, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to discuss potential resolutions with his/her client, and to otherwise prepare for trial.
c. Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of February 25, 2013 to May 6, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
DATED: 2-21-13. /s/ Lee Bickley Assistant United States Attorney DATED: 2-21-13 /s/ Patrick K. Hanly Counsel for Defendant Svetlana Dubinsky DATED: 2-21-13 /s/ Chris Cannon Counsel for Defendant Serge Doubinski DATED: 2-21-13 ...