IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
March 5, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF,
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Garland E. Burrell, Jr. Senior United States District Judge
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on March 1, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until March 22, 2013 and to exclude time between March 1, 2013 and March 22, 2013 under Local Code T4. The United States does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The United States has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes investigative reports, laboratory reports, and related documents in electronic form, constituting approximately 70 pages of documents. This discovery has been produced directly to counsel. Furthermore, on February 6, 2013, the United States made a formal offer to resolve the case.
b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with his client, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, including with respect to possible mitigation evidence, and to discuss potential resolutions with his client and the United States, as well as discuss with his client the options for preparing the matter for trial.
c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The United States does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of March 1, 2013 to March 22, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
Dated: February 26, 2013 BENJAMIN B. WAGNER United States Attorney /s/ Todd A. Pickles TODD A. PICKLES Assistant United States Attorney Dated: February 26, 2013 /s/ Todd A. Pickles for KENNETH WINE Counsel for Defendant
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
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