UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
March 8, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
ANDREY ANDREYEV, ET AL
The opinion of the court was delivered by: John A. Mendez United States District Court Judge
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER
SPEEDY TRIAL ACT;[PROPOSED] ) FINDINGS AND ORDER
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, Andrey Andreyev and Vitaliy Andreyev, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on March 12, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference set for March 12, 2013, and to schedule this matter for change of plea on April 16, 2013 at 9:45 a.m., and to exclude time between March 12, 2013 and April 16, 2013 under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The parties have reached an agreement in principle. However, minor revisions to the current versions of the plea agreement are being worked out.
b. Counsel desire additional time to finalize the terms of the plea agreements. Counsel for defendants need additional time to consult with their clients, review the current charges, and conduct investigations and research related to the charges in preparation for the plea and in the alternative preparation for trial.
c. Both defense counsel are currently involved in a pending murder case in Butte County in a case stemming from the death of a child. A dependency action stemming from the death in question just concluded on March 4, 2013, and bother defense counsel were involved in a three-month-long "trial" / jurisdictional hearing that led to the conclusion of the dependency proceeding.
d. Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
e. The government does not object to the continuance.
f. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
g. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of March 12, 2013 to April 16, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
DATED: March 8, 2013. /s/ Lee Bickley LEE BICKLEY Assistant United States Attorney DATED: March 8, 2013. Victor Haltom VICTOR HALTOM /s/ Counsel for Defendant A. Andreyev DATED: March 8, 2013. John R. Duree, Jr. JOHN R. DUREE, JR. /s/ Counsel for Defendant V. Andreyev
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