UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
March 14, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
RYAN COSTO, DEFENDANT.
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through her counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. Defendant first appeared before Magistrate Judge Newman, a judicial officer in the court in which this charge is pending, on September 21, 2012. On that date, this matter was set for status on October 11, 2012 before Judge England. In addition, at the request of defendant, for the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period from September 21 through October 11, 2012, was deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and B (iv) [Local Code T4].
By previous stipulations, this Court continued the status conference until March 14, 2013, and excluded time between October 11, 2012 and March 14, 2013, under Local Code T4.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until May 2, 2013 and to exclude time between March 14, 2013 and May 2, 2013, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the court find the following:
a. The government has represented that there is voluminous discovery associated with the case. To date, the government has produced approximately 1,669 pages of discovery. Moreover, hundreds of pages of materials obtained via grand jury subpoena have also been made available to the for inspection and copying by the defense.
b. Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with his client, to review the current charges, to conduct investigation related to the charges, to review and potentially copy discovery for this matter, and to otherwise prepare for trial.
c. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Counsel for defendant has specifically discussed all of the contents of this stipulation with his client and represents that his client concurs with the contents of this stipulation.
f. Defendant Ryan Costo has specifically discussed all of the contents of this stipulation with his counsel and represents that he concurs with the contents of this stipulation.
g. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original dates prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
h. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of March 14, 2013 to May 2, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B (iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the judge at defendant's request on the basis of the judge's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
DATED: 11 March 2013. Tice-Raskin S. ROBERT TICE-RASKIN Assistant United States Attorney DATED: 11 March 2013. /s/ Bill Portanova WILLIAM PORTANOVA Counsel for Defendant DATED: 11 March 2013. /s/ Ryan Costo RYAN COSTO Defendant
IT IS SO ORDERED.
© 1992-2013 VersusLaw Inc.