IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
March 14, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF,
BRENDEN BARKER, DEFENDANT.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Garland E. Burrell, Jr. Senior United States District Judge
REQUEST TO SET MATTER FOR CHANGE OF PLEA AND STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on March 22, 2013.
2. The parties hereby request that this matter be set for a hearing regarding the defendant's change of plea on April 12, 2013.
3. By this stipulation, defendant further moves to exclude time between May 22, 2013 and April 12, 2013 under Local Code T4. The United States does not oppose this request.
4. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The United States has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes investigative reports, laboratory reports, and related documents in electronic form, constituting approximately 70 pages of documents. This discovery has been produced directly to counsel.
Furthermore, on February 6, 2013, the United States made a formal offer to resolve the case.
b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with his client, including discussing the terms of the plea agreement.
c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The United States does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of March 22, 2013 to April 12, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
5. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
Dated: March 12, 2013 BENJAMIN B. WAGNER United States Attorney /s/ Todd A. Pickles TODD A. PICKLES Assistant United States Attorney Dated: March 12, 2013 /s/ Todd A. Pickles for KENNETH WINE Counsel for Defendant
For the foregoing reasons, the Court adopts the parties' Request and Stipulation. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT this matter is continued from March 22, 2013 to April 12, 2013, and shall be set for a hearing on defendant's change of plea on April 12, 2013 at 9:00 a.m.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT for the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of March 22, 2013 to April 12, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4].
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
© 1992-2013 VersusLaw Inc.