The opinion of the court was delivered by: Garland E. Burrell, Jr. Senior United States District Judge
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and the defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on March 22, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, the defendants now move to continue the status conference until May 3, 2013, at 9:00 a.m., and to exclude time between March 22, 2013, and May 3, 2013, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes approximately 273 pages of investigative reports, audio recordings, and photos. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b. Counsel for the defendant desires additional time to consult with his client, to review the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to review and copy discovery for this matter, to discuss potential resolutions with his client, to prepare pretrial motions, and to otherwise prepare for trial. Additionally, at the request of the defense, the Probation Department has completed a Pre-Plea report. The parties are working to see if this case may resolve by plea agreement and need additional time. There were some issues raised by the Pre-Plea Report that warrant further defense investigation.
c. Counsel for the defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of March 22, 2013 and May 3, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from ...