The opinion of the court was delivered by: John A. Houston United States District Judge
ORDER GRANTING ) DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO ) DISMISS [Doc. No. 6]
Currently pending before this Court is the motion to dismiss Factory Connection Racing, Inc.'s ("Plaintiff" or "FCR") complaint filed by Radiate Group, Inc. ("Defendant"). The motion has been fully briefed by the parties. After careful review of the parties' submissions, and for the following reasons, this Court GRANTS Defendant's motion to dismiss. BACKGROUND
On June 6, 2012, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant alleging the following causes of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) violation of the Miller-Ayala Athlete Agents Act ("Act"); (4) Unjust Enrichment; and (5) Declaratory Relief. See Doc. No. 1. On August 1, 2012, Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss Plaintiff's third cause of action for violation of the Act pursuant to the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) [Doc. No.6].*fn1 On September 3, 2012, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motion, including a request for leave to amend. See Doc. No. 11. On September 10, 2012, Defendant filed a reply. See Doc. No. 14.
After a careful review of the parties' submissions, and for the following reasons, this Court GRANTS Defendant's motion to dismiss. //
II. Factual Background*fn2
FCR, a manufacturer of performance motorcycle parts and operator of a professional motorcycle racing team, alleges in its complaint that, on July 26, 2006, the parties entered into a one-year written Representation Agreement ("Agreement"). Under the Agreement, Defendant, a marketing agency, agreed to negotiate and solicit sponsorship opportunities on behalf of FCR. See Doc. No. 1 at 2. FCR appointed Defendant as its "exclusive sales agency for the purpose of acquiring all non-endemic (outside the motorcycle industry) sponsorships" for FCR's teams in an "exclusive, worldwide basis for the term hereof." See Doc. No. 1-2 at 2. Plaintiff is required to pay commission fees, during and after the expiration of the term of the Agreement, from any sponsorship that Defendant secures for Plaintiff. Id. at 3. Plaintiff alleges that on July 17, 2007, Defendant and FCR agreed in writing to extend the Agreement until July 26, 2008. See Doc. No. 1 at 3. In 2009, Defendant became the agent for one of FCR's motocross racers, Trey Canrad ("Canrad"). See Doc. No. 1 at 5. FCR advised Defendant that because of its representation of Canrad, Defendant created a conflict of interest, and as such, no further commissions or obligations are owed to Defendant. Id. at 6. Plaintiff maintains that the Agreement is void and unenforceable because Defendant did not comply with the Act by failing to file a disclosure statement with the California Secretary of State and post a surety bond in connection with its relationship with FCR. Id. at 4-6. It is undisputed that Defendant did not at any relevant time satisfy the requirements of the Act. See Doc. No. 6-1 at 8.
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. [Doc. No. 6].
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Dismissal is warranted under Rule 12(b)(6) where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984); see Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989) ("Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law."). Alternatively, a complaint may be dismissed where it presents a cognizable legal theory yet fails to plead essential facts under that theory. Robertson, 749 F.2d at 534. While a plaintiff need not give "detailed factual allegations," he must plead sufficient facts that, if true, "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007).
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547). A claim is facially plausible when the factual allegations permit "the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. In other words, "the nonconclusory 'factual content,' and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief. Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950.
In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume the truth of all factual allegations and must construe all inferences from them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002); Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). However, legal conclusions need not be taken as true merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003); Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint, documents relied upon but not attached to the complaint when authenticity is not contested, and matters of which the Court takes judicial notice. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001). If a court determines ...