IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
March 26, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
SHAVANE BOUASANGOUANE AND RENEY BOUASANGOUANE,
STIPULATION REGARDING CONTINUANCE AND EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
STIPULATION RE: CONTINUANCE
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for trial on June 18, 2013, at 8:30 a.m. and trial confirmation on June 3, 2013, at 10 a.m.
2. By this stipulation, the parties now move to continue the trial to October 8, 2013, at 8:30 a.m. and trial confirmation on September 16, 2013, at 10:00 a.m. and to exclude time between June 18, 2013, and October 8, 2013. It is further requested that the date for filing in limine motions be continued from May 2 to August 22 and the filing of any responses to in limine motions be continued from May 16 to September 5.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. Counsel for the government and defendant James have unanticipated conflicts, including, but not limited to, the following facts: (i) Shavane Bousangouane was recently in a serious car accident, (ii) counsel for the government has jury duty in state court on September 24, (iii) counsel for the government has annual leave the week before trial is ready to commence in this case, and (iv) October 8 is the next earliest date available to all parties.
b. Counsel for the government and the defendants believe that failure to grant the above- requested continuance would deny them availability of counsel and reasonable time necessary for effective resolution/preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
c. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of June 18, 2013, to October 8, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at the request of counsel for the government and defense on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial and would ensure continuity of counsel.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
DATED: March 25, 2013. Respectfully submitted, BENJAMIN B. WAGNER United States Attorney /s/ Karen A. Escobar___________________ KAREN A. ESCOBAR Assistant United States Attorney DATED: March 25. 2013. /s/ Gary Huss _____________ GARY HUSS Counsel for Defendant Shavane Bousangouane DATED: March 25. 2013. Carol Moses CAROL MOSES Counsel for Defendant Reney Bousangouane
IT IS SO ORDERED.
SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE
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