The opinion of the court was delivered by: Jennifer L. Thurston United States Magistrate Judge
ORDER AWARDING MONETARY SANCTIONS AGAINST DEFENDANTS
Laren Salisbury ("Plaintiff") seeks sanctions against defendants Arthur Hickman, Jaqueline Hickman, Joseph Termini, and Umberto Crimini (collectively, "Defendants") for failure to comply with the Court's order to provide further discovery. (Docs. 40, 42). On March 18, 2013, the Court granted Plaintiff's request for sanctions in part, finding monetary sanctions were appropriate. (Doc. 51 at 7).
In accordance with the Court's order, Plaintiff's counsel file a declaration reciting the costs and fees incurred (Doc. 50), to which Defendants filed a brief in opposition (Doc. 54). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will award sanctions in the amount of $1,202.50.
I. Imposition of Sanctions
Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, if a party "fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery . . . the court where the action is pending may issue further just orders." Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b). The Court must "order the disobedient party, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was 2 substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust." Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 37(b)(2)(C). Thus, the Ninth Circuit explained Rule 37 "authorizes the district court, in its discretion, 4 to impose a wide range of sanctions when a party fails to comply with the rules of discovery or with 5 court orders enforcing those rules." Wyle v. R. J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., 709 F.2d 857, 589 (9th Cir. 6 1983) (citing Nat'l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976)). 7
Here, the Court has determined monetary sanctions are appropriate for Defendants' failure to 8 comply with the Court's discovery order. (Doc. 51). Accordingly, the only issue remaining is the 9 amount of sanctions to be imposed against Defendants. In determining the amount of monetary sanctions, the Court must be guided by a standard of reasonableness. Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 2006). The Ninth Circuit explained that recovery should not exceed "those expenses and fees that were reasonably necessary to resist the offending action." In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1185, amended by 803 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1986). III. Discussion and Analysis
The Ninth Circuit utilizes a "lodestar" method to compute reasonable attorneys' fees, which represents the number of hours reasonable expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008); Jordan v. Multnomah County, 815 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1987). Adjustments from the lodestar are proper only in "rare" and "exceptional" cases, and must be supported by specific evidence in the record. Jordan, 815 F.2d at 1262.
A. Time expended by counsel
The Court ordered Plaintiff's counsel to submit a declaration of the attorneys' fees incurred as a result of having to bring the motion for sanctions. (Doc. 49). In accordance with the Court's order, Mark Roy submitted a declaration, asserting he "spent 6.7 hours in preparing the motion for sanctions and in preparing for and appearing at the hearing." (Roy Decl. ¶ 3). Specifically, Mr. Roy seeks fees for the following time:
memorandum in support of motion 0.6 2/26/13 Additional research and revisions to memorandum in support of
3/8/13 Review defendants' opposition
to motion 0.3
Review discovery produced by defendants on 3/8/13 and prepare
for hearing on motion
Prepare for hearing on
review of discovery produced by defendants on 3/8/13 and of
plaintiff's statement re status of discovery in dispute 3/12/13 1.0 3/13/13 Preparation of appearance at hearing on motion for
(Roy Decl. ¶ 3). Further, Mr. Roy asserted he "was assisted by GLBA Fair Housing Law Project staff 6 attorney Erica S. Fessler," who spent 1. 9 hours to the motion, including 1.5 drafting the memorandum 7 on February 22, 2013, and 0.4 hours reviewing and revising memorandum on February 26, 2013. (Id. 8 at ¶¶ 5-6). Accordingly, Plaintiff's counsel seek attorney fees for a total of 8.6 hours in conjunction 9 with the motion for sanctions.
Defendants opposed the request for fees by filing a declaration of James Braze. (Doc. 54). According to Mr. Braze, "the time spent by Attorney Fessler should be enough to prepare the motion." (Braze Decl. ¶ 9). He argues that "the dates of the work performed did not correspond with the court's records." (Id.) Specifically, Mr. Braze notes:
The court's records indicate that motions for sanctions were filed on February 20, 2013 and February 22, 2013. Attorney Fessler is charging 1.9 hours for time spent February 22, 2013 and February 26, 2013. Attorney Roy is charging 1.4 ...