The opinion of the court was delivered by: Garland E. Burrell, Jr. Senior United States District Judge
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, defendant NINA NGUYEN, by and through her counsel of record, Scott N. Cameron, and LUAN TRAN, by and through his counsel of record, MICHAEL BIGELOW, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on April 5, 2013, at 9 a.m.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until May 10, 2013, and to exclude time between April 5, 2013, and May 10, 2013, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has produced approximately 21,362 pages of discovery to the defense.
b. Michael Bigelow, counsel for LUAN TRAN, was only recently appointed by the Court on March 25, 2013.
c. Respective counsel for each defendant desires additional time to review the document discovery, consult with their client regarding the discovery, conduct investigation, and to discuss potential resolution with their client and the government.
d. Counsel for each defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny defendants the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
e. The government does not object to the continuance.
f. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
g. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of April 5, 2013, to May 10, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice ...