STIPULATION REGARDING CONTINUANCE AND EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT, FINDINGS AND ORDER STIPULATION RE: CONTINUANCE
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for trial on May 21, 2013, at 8:30 a.m. and trial confirmation on May 6, 2013, at 10 a.m. Currently, motions in limine are due Friday, April 5, and responses due on April 19.
2. By this stipulation, the parties now move to continue the trial to January 28, 2014, at 8:30 a.m. and trial confirmation on January 13, 2014, at 10:00 a.m. and to exclude time between May 21, 2013, and January 28, 2014. It is further requested that the date for filing in limine motions be continued from April 5 to December 2 and the filing of any responses to in limine motions be continued from April 19 to December 16.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a. Counsel for the government and defendant James have unanticipated conflicts and are not available for trial until January 28.
b. Counsel for the government and the defendants believe that failure to grant the above- requested continuance would deny them availability of counsel and reasonable time necessary for effective resolution/preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
c. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of May 21, 2013, to January 28, 2014, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at the request of counsel for the government and defense on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial and would ensure continuity of counsel.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
DATED: April 3, 2013. Respectfully submitted, BENJAMIN B. WAGNER United States Attorney /s/ Karen A. Escobar___________________ KAREN A. ESCOBAR Assistant United States Attorney DATED: April 3, 2013. /s/ John McFarland _____________ JOHN McFARLAND Counsel for Defendant