STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and the defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on April 4, 2013. 2. By this stipulation, the defendant now moves to continue the status conference until April 11, 2013, and to exclude time between April 4, 2013 and April 11, 2013, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes approximately 260 pages of investigative reports and related documents in electronic form and some audio recordings. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b. Counsel for the defendant desires additional time to consult with his client, to review the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to review and copy discovery for this matter, to discuss potential resolutions with his client, to prepare pretrial motions, and to otherwise prepare for trial. Additionally, the Court ordered, at the defense's request, Probation to prepare a pre-plea probation report. The probation officer has completed the report. The parties need more time to investigate issues raised by the report and to see if a plea agreement can be reached.
c. Counsel for the defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance. e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of April 4, 2013, to April 11, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
Dated: March 29, 2013 BENJAMIN WAGNER U.S. ATTORNEY by: /s/ David D. Fischer for DANIEL MCCONKIE Assistant U.S. Attorney Attorney for Plaintiff Dated: March 29, 2013 /s/ David D. Fischer DAVID D. FISCHER Attorney for Defendant ALONZO STEVE BARNETT