STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER CONTINUING PRELIMINARY HEARING
IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED BY AND BETWEEN Assistant United States Attorney Michael D. McCoy, counsel for the plaintiff United States of America, and defendant Gregory Thomas Phelan, by and through his counsel Timothy Zindel, that good cause exists to continue the preliminary hearing currently set for April 15, 2013, at 2:00 p.m., to May 6, 2013, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5.1(d).
On March 13, 2013, defendant Gregory Thomas Phelan was charged by Criminal Complaint with knowingly and intentionally manufacturing and possessing with the intent to distribute marijuana, a Schedule I Controlled Substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and knowingly possessing a firearm in relation to and in furtherance of the above referenced drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).
On March 18, 2013, defendant Gregory Thomas Phelan was arrested and appeared in front of Magistrate Judge Dale A. Drozd for his initial appearance. At the initial appearance, Magistrate Judge Drozd ordered the defendant temporarily detained and set the preliminary hearing for April 1, 2013. At the defendant's subsequent detention hearing, which was held on March 21, 2013, the defendant waived his right to a speedy preliminary hearing and requested a continuance of the preliminary hearing to April 15, 2013.*fn1
The 30 period for filing an information or indictment in this matter, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), runs on April 12, 2013. However, under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), periods of delay in computing the time within which an information or an indictment must be filed shall be excluded when the "delay result[s] from a continuance granted by any judge . . . at the request of the defendant or . . . the Government, if the judge grant[s] such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." One of the factors that a judge shall consider in determining whether to grant a continuance under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) is "whether the failure to grant such a continuance . . . would deny counsel for the defendant or the attorney for the Government the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv).
On April 3, 2013, the Government provided the defendant with over 350 pages of advance discovery, which included video and photographic evidence. Since then, both the Government and counsel for the defendant have communicated regarding a potential pre-indictment resolution of this matter. However, before any potential agreement can be reached, both parties will need additional time to review the discovery and conduct additional conversations on the matter.
The government and defendant agree that the combination of discovery review, attorney preparation, and consideration of a possible pre-indictment resolution to this matter constitute good cause to extend the time for preliminary hearing under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5.1(d), as well as under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv). This exclusion of time includes the period up to and including May 6, 2013.
Timothy Zindel agrees to this request and has authorized Assistant United States Attorney Michael D. McCoy to sign this stipulation on his behalf.
DATED: April 9, 2013 By: /s/ Michael D. McCoy MICHAEL D. McCOY Assistant U.S. Attorney DATED: April 9, 2013 /s/ Michael D. McCoy for TIMOTHY ZINDEL Attorney for Defendant GREGORY THOMAS PHELAN
1. The preliminary hearing set for April 15, 2013, is continued to May 6, 2013, at 2:00 p.m.
2. Based on the stipulations and representations of the parties, the Court finds good cause to extend the time for the preliminary hearing, and time is excluded up to and including May 6, 2013, (18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv) and Local Code T4 (reasonable time to prepare)) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court on the basis of the Court's findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.