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M. Norman Hammerlord v. Vivien Wang

April 15, 2013

M. NORMAN HAMMERLORD,
PLAINTIFF,
v.
VIVIEN WANG, AN INDIVIDUAL; AND DOES 1 THROUGH 25 INCLUSIVE, DEFENDANTS.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hayes, Judge:

ORDER

The matters before the Court are the Motion for Summary Judgment or Alternatively Summary Adjudication of Issues, and Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings ("Motion for Summary Judgment") filed by Defendant (ECF No. 49), and the Motion for Writ of Review filed by Plaintiff (ECF No. 54).

I. Background

On July 15, 2011, Plaintiff M. Norman Hammerlord, proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint in this Court. (ECF No. 1). The Complaint alleges that Defendant Vivien Wang is the owner of Parkview Senior Apartments ("Parkview Apartments") in San Diego, and Plaintiff has been a resident of Parkview Apartments since January 1, 2000. The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff's housing was subsidized by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") and the San Diego Housing Commission, and "Plaintiff was told that he could stay at Parkview [Apartments] indefinitely (life) as long as he obeyed the rules and regulations." Id. at 3. The Complaint alleges that, on January 3, 2011, four detectives from the San Diego Police Department searched Plaintiff's apartment based upon a "false and misleading report" that "may have been made" by Carl Moccafiche, the apartment manager, and Victoria McCoullough, a tenant. Id. at 4. The Complaint alleges that, on May 31, 2011, Defendant served Plaintiff with a ninety day notice of termination of tenancy. The Complaint alleges five claims for relief: (1) fraudulent statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001; (2) terminating Plaintiff's lease in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1437f; (3) invasion of privacy; (4) violation of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and/or § 1983; and (5) harassment.

On December 26, 2012, Defendant filed the Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 49). Defendant states:

[T]his Motion is made pursuant to Plaintiff's inability to prove the essential elements of each claim for relief because of a lack of evidence. This motion is further made pursuant to (1) Plaintiff's lack of a private right to action for his First Claim for Relief; (2) the full faith and credit clause for his Second Claim for Relief; (3) and a failure to show any factual support for his Third, Fourth, and Fifth Claims for Relief.

Id. at 2. In support of the Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant filed three affidavits and numerous exhibits.

On January 16, 2013, Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment and a verified brief which was filed in an unlawful detainer action filed by Wang against Hammerlord in San Diego County Superior Court. (ECF No. 56).

On January 16, 2013, Plaintiff filed the Motion for Writ of Review requesting that this Court "review" a November 7, 2011 order issued by the San Diego Superior Court entering judgment in favor of Wang and against Hammerlord in the unlawful detainer action and awarding possession of Plaintiff's former apartment unit to Wang. (ECF No. 54 at 4).

On January 23, 2013, Defendant filed a reply in support of the Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 58). On January 29, 2013, Defendant filed an opposition to the Motion for Writ of Review. (ECF No. 59). On February 8, 2013, Plaintiff filed a reply brief in support of the Motion for Writ of Review. (ECF No. 60).

II. Standard of Review

"A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense-or the part of each claim or defense-on which summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A material fact is one that is relevant to an element of a claim or defense and whose existence might affect the outcome of the suit. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The materiality of a fact is determined by the substantive law governing the claim or defense. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is proper. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970). The burden then shifts to the opposing party to provide admissible evidence beyond the pleadings to show that summary judgment is not appropriate. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24. To avoid summary judgment, the opposing party cannot rest solely on conclusory allegations of fact or law. See Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). Instead, the non-movant must designate which specific facts show that there is a genuine issue for ...


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