The opinion of the court was delivered by: United States District Judge Dean D. Pregerson
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO INTERVENE [Dkt. No. 24]
Presently before the court is Proposed Intervenors Michael Weinstein, Marijane Jackson, Arlette De La Cruz, Mark McGrath, Whitney Engeran, and the Campaign Committee Yes on B, Major Funding by the AIDS Healthcare Foundation (collectively "Proposed Intervenors")'s Motion to Intervene. Having considered the parties submissions and heard oral argument, the court adopts the following order.
On November 6, 2012, 57% of voters in Los Angeles County approved Measure B. (Compl. ¶ 36.) Measure B requires producers of adult films to obtain a permit from the Los Angeles County Department of Public Health before production can take place. (Id. ¶ 41.) To obtain the permit, valid for two years but subject to revocation, a producer must pay a fee and evidence successful completion of a blood borne pathogen training course. (Id.) Additionally, Measure B requires the use of condoms by performers for all acts of anal or vaginal sex during the production of adult films. (Id. ¶ 42.)
Plaintiffs are corporations and individuals involved in the adult film industry as producers, employers, and performers. (Id. ¶¶ 8-11.) On January 10, 2013, they filed this action against Jonathan Fielding, Director of Los Angeles County Department of Public Health, in his official capacity; Jackie Lacey, Los Angeles County District Attorney, in her official capacity; and the County of Los Angeles (collectively "Defendants").
Proposed Intervenors were the official proponents of Measure
B. Proposed Intervenors drafted the language that would become Measure B, collected signatures to qualify the Measure for the November 2012 ballot, submitted the signatures for verification, raised funds, and drafted an argument for the appearance of the Measure on the ballot. (Weinstein Decl. ¶¶ 3, 5-7.) They filed this Motion to Intervene on March 1, 2013.
Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure governs intervention as of right and provides, in pertinent part: "On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene who . . . claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest." Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
To intervene as of right under Rule 24(a)(2), the movant must demonstrate that: "(1) it has a significant protectable interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action; (2) the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect its interest; (3) the application is timely; and (4) the existing parties may not adequately represent the applicant's interest." United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 397 (9th Cir. 2002)(quoting Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 409 (9th Cir. 1998)). The movant-intervenor bears the burden of showing that all the requirements for intervention have been met. Id. at 397.
In determining whether intervention is appropriate, courts are guided by practical and equitable considerations, and the requirements for intervention are broadly interpreted in favor of intervention. Donnelly, 159 F.3d at 409; Forest Conservation Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 66 F.3d 1489, 1493 (9th Cir. 1995).
Additionally, under Rule 24(b)(1)(B), a court "may permit" a party to intervene who has (1) timely made a motion to intervene and (2) has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B).
A. Intervention and Article ...