The opinion of the court was delivered by: Barbara A. McAuliffe United States Magistrate Judge
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS [ECF No. 1]
Petitioner is proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus on March 18, 2013. Petitioner challenging the Board of Parole Hearings' 2010 denial of parole. He specifically contends that the record does not support that he has failed to reform, his incarceration beyond the Indeterminate Sentencing Law mandate is an ex post facto violation, and application of Marsy's law resulted in a due process and ex post facto violation.
I. Challenge to Parole Determination
In the context of a state parole hearing, a federal court's habeas corpus review is extremely limited. The United States Supreme Court in Swarthout v. Cook, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 859, 863 (2011) (per curiam) held that "the responsibility for assuring that the constitutionally adequate procedures governing California's parole system are properly applied rests with California courts," and not with the federal court. Since there is no right under the United States Constitution to be released before the expiration of a valid sentence, the federal court's review role is to focus solely on whether a prisoner denied parole received due process-defined as whether the prisoner "was allowed an opportunity to be heard and was provided a statement of the reasons why parole was denied." Id., at 862 (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 16 (1979). "The Constitution does not require more [process]." Id.
A review of the instant case reveals Petitioner was present at his parole hearing, was given an opportunity to be heard, and was provided a statement of reasons for the parole board's decision. (See Pet. Ex. B., Tr. of September 2, 2010, hearing.) Accordingly, under Swarthout, the federal court's inquiry ends and the petitioner's present petition fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and hence, the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus must be dismissed. Additionally, because there is no tenable claim for relief that can be pled by further amendment to the petition, the granting of leave to amend would be futile and result in the same finding. See Jarvis v. Nelson, 440 F.2d 13, 14 (9th Cir. 1971).
II. Marsy's Law/Ex Post Facto Violation Petitioner also claims Marsy's Law was applied to him retroactively in violation of his due process rights. At the September 2, 2010 hearing, his next parole consideration hearing was postponed for threeyears.
There is no evidence in the record that Petitioner has been wrongly denied parole or that he was wrongly denied the process for expedited parole review provided for in Penal Code § 3041.5, subdivision (d). The court finds that Marsy's Law, as applied to Petitioner, does not create a significant risk that Petitioner will receive ex post facto punishment.
As explained in detail below, Marsy's law increased the minimum parole hearing deferral period from one year to three years, the maximum deferral period from five years to fifteen years, and the default deferral period from one year to fifteen years. Cal. Penal Code § 3041.5; Gilman v. Schwarzenegger, 638 F.3d 1101, 1104 (9th Cir. 2011).
The Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution prohibits the states from passing any "ex post facto law," a prohibition that "is aimed at laws 'that retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts.'" Cal. Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 504 (1995); see also Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981) (providing that "[t]he ex post facto prohibition forbids the Congress and the States to enact any law 'which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed; or imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed.'"). The United States Supreme Court has held that "[r]etroactive changes in laws governing parole of prisoners, in some instances, may be violative of this precept." Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 250 (2000).
On November 4, 2008, California voters passed Proposition 9, the "Victims' Bill of Rights Act of 2008: Marsy's Law," which, inter alia, altered the frequency of parole hearings for prisoners not found suitable for parole. Cal. Penal Code § 3041.5; Cal. Const., art. I, § 28. Prior to the passage of Proposition 9, in the event a prisoner was determined unsuitable for parole, a subsequent parole hearing would be held annually thereafter. Cal Penal Code § 3041.5(b)(2) (2008). If the parole board determined it was not reasonable to expect parole would be granted within the next year, it could defer rehearing for two years. Id. If the prisoner was convicted of murder and it was not reasonable to expect he/she would be granted parole within the year, the board could select a rehearing term of up to five years. Id. Proposition 9 changed the frequency of subsequent parole hearings as follows:
The board shall schedule the next hearing, after considering the views and interests of the victim, as follows:
(A) Fifteen years after any hearing at which parole is denied, unless the board finds by clear and convincing evidence that the criteria relevant to the setting of parole release dates enumerated in subdivision (a) of Section 3041 are such that consideration of the public and victim's safety does not require a ...