April 29, 2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
SERGEY SHCHIRSKIY, et. al., Defendants.
BENJAMIN B. WAGNER, United States Attorney, R. STEVEN LAPHAM, LEE S. BICKLEY, Assistant United States Attorneys, Sacramento, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff, United States of America.
Danny D. Brace, Jr., Counsel for Defendant Sergey Shchirskiy.
Chris Haydn-Myer, Counsel for Defendant Anton Tkachev.
Candice L. Fields, Counsel for Defendant Nazhmudin Rustamov.
STIPULATION REGARDING CONINUATION OF STATUS CONFERENCE AND EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants Sergey Shchirskiy, Anton Tkachev, and Nazhmudin Rustamov, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on May 2, 2013 at 9:00 a.m. before Judge Morrison England.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until July 11, 2013, at 9:30 a.m. before Judge Troy Nunley, and to exclude time between May 2, 2013 and July 11, 2013, inclusive, under Local Code T4 (to allow defense counsel time to prepare). Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes over 1, 500 pages of discovery, including investigative reports and bank records and related documents. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b. Counsel for the defendants desire additional time to consult with their clients, to review the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to review and copy discovery for this matter, and to discuss potential resolutions with their clients. Counsel for Mr. Rustamov was appointed in March 2013.
c. Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of May 2, 2013 to July 11, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.