The opinion of the court was delivered by: Garland E. Burrell, Jr. Senior United States District Judge
STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL
ACT; (PROPOSED) FINDINGS AND ) ORDER
It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the parties hereto, through their respective counsel, as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on May 3, 2013.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until June 14, 2013, and to exclude time between May 3, 2013, and June 14, 2013, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes approximately 745 pages of documents. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b. Counsel for defendants desire additional time to consult with their clients, to review the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges and to discuss potential resolutions with their clients. Counsel are in the process of setting another meeting with the clients and an interpreter for further consultation. Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
c. The government does not object to the continuance.
d. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of May 3, 2013, to June 14, 2013, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
Dated: April 30, 2013 /s/ Candace A. Fry CANDACE A. FRY, Attorney for AGVAN NERSESYAN, Defendant Dated: April 30, 2013 HEATHER WILLIAMS, Federal Defender By /s/ Candace A. Fry for DOUGLAS BEEVERS. Assistant Federal Defender, Attorney for EMMA NERSESYAN, Defendant Dated: April 30, 2013 BENJAMIN B. WAGNER United States Attorney By /s/ Candace A. Fry for LEE S. BICKLEY ...